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Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See
the Forest and the Trees
fby

ing to the passage of the Admino issue pervaded
theAct
debates
istrative
Procedure
more leadthan
the appropriateness of administrative agency
adjudication and the proper role of the
hearing officer.
In the late 1930's a special committee of
the American Bar Association, concerned
about agency use of untrained, easily influenced, subordinate employees to preside
over hearings, warned that "a combination
oflegislative, executive, andjudicial power
should not be exercised by the same group
'2
of Federal officers and employees." The
committee proposed a Federal administrative court with both appellate and trial jurisdiction, composed of 41 justices plus a
number of "commissioners" to hear testimony. This view received a stimulus by
President Roosevelt's Committee on
Administrative Management which not only
concluded that independent agencies
"constitute a headless 'fourth branch' of
the Government," but also recommended
that the agencies be divided into separate
administrative and judicial sections.' Focus
on the role of the hearing officer was heightened by a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with the first Morgan case's
proclamation that, "The one who decides
must hear."'
In 1939 the debate came to a head for
the first time. The ABA had withdrawn its
support for an administrative court bill and
had instead thrown its weight behind the
Walter-Logan bill which provided for use
of hearing boards in single-headed agencies, and hearing examiners in multi-headed
agencies with a system of intensive administrative and judicial review.I The bill was
*Jeffrey S. Lubbers is Research Director of
the Administrative Conference of the United
States and Deputy Chair, FBA Section on
Administrative Law. The views expressed are
solely those of the author and are not attributable
to any other source.
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passed by Congress but President Roosevelt vetoed it in strong terms as motivated
by "a combination of lawyers who desire
to have all processes of government conducted through lawsuits and of interests
which desire to escape regulation." He also
complained that "a large part of the legal
profession has never reconciled itself to the
existence of the administrative tribunal.
Many of them prefer the stately ritual of
courts, in which lawyers play all the speaking parts, to the simple procedure of administrative hearings which a client can understand and even participate in. "I
In his veto message, President Roosevelt
announced that he was asking his Attorney
General to form a Committee on Administrative Procedure to study the operations
of the regulatory agencies. The Attorney
General's Committee, through its in-depth
study of the agencies, managed to remove
the bitterness from the debate, and though
differences remained among members as
to the feasibility of omnibus legislation, the
entire Committee did agree to the need to
"improve the process of formal adjudication by bringing about a more uniformly
high quality of hearing officers."'
In 1946, after the wartime interruption,
the complicated and compromise-laden
Administrative Procedure Act that we know
today was unanimously passed by both
Houses of Congress and signed by President Truman.' Commentators of the day
considered the Act's provisions regarding
hearing examiners to be among the most
9
important changes effected by the Act.
And in the years following the passage of
the APA, much ink was spilled in trying to
apply the provisions of the new Act to the
incumbent hearing examiners in the var0
ious regulatory agencies.t
Now in 1984, the inkwell is pumping again.
Although the Administrative Procedure Act
has remained essentially unchanged since
1946, the adjudication system it spawned
has undergone a rather striking transformation, and administrative law commentators are again beginning to call for revi-

sions in the system." The purpose of this
article is to examine the contours of the
administrative adjudication system, to provide facts as to current agency caseload,
to alert readers to the broad variety of cases
handled by agency administrative lawjudges
(ALs) and other "non-ALJ" hearing officers and to consider how these trends affect
proposals to reform the system.

Trends from 1946 to 1984
2

As has been documented elsewhere, the
steady growth in the number of Federal
ALJs has finally leveled off, but there are
still five times as many APA-appointed
administrative law judges in 1984 as there
were in 1947:
June, 1947:
June, 1954:
July, 1962:
February, 1974:
January, 1979:
January, 1980:
June, 1981:
October, 1982:

1%
278
494
792
1071
1146
1119
1183

April, 1983:
June, 1984:

1158
1121

But this increase masks the roiling that
is going on below the surface. In 1947 64%
(N = 125) of the total were concentrated in
the economic regulatory agencies and 6.6%
(N = 13) were in the Social Security Administration. At the end of 1978, 14.7% (N = 157)
were in the economic regulatory agencies
and 61.6% (N =660) in Social Security. By
1984 the original ratio was almost exactly
reversed with only 6.5% (N = 73) in the 12
economic regulatory agencies, while 67.8%
(N = 760) were in Social Security. In fact
three agencies (Social Security, National
Labor Relations Board and Department of
Labor) employ 85% (951) of the 1121 judges,
and 24 of the 29 agencies employ 12 or
fewer judges. During this period, labor
related ALJs also increased steadily from

Agency Caseloads and ALI Positions 1978 versus 1983-84
Agency

-'

ALJs-1i79
Agriculture, Department of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Bur. of (Dept. of
Treasury)
Civil Aeronautics Board
)
Commerce, Department of"
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Drug Enforcement Administration (Dept. of Justice)
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Food and Drug Administration (Dept. of H.H.S.)
Housing and Urban Development, Department of
c)
Interior, Department of the'
Interstate Commerce Commission
Labor, Department of
Merit Systems Protection Board
National Labor Relations Board
National Transportation Safety Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
Small Business Administration
Social Security Administration (Dept. of H.H.S.)
U.S. Coast Guard (Department of Transportation)
U.S. International Trade Commission
U.S. Postal Service

Note: The 1978 figures are from "Federal Administrative Law Judge Hearings-Statistical Report for 1976-1978"
Administrative Conference of the U.S.
(1980) pp. 21, 33. The 1984 ALJ totals
were supplied by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, June 8, 1984.
The 1983 caseload figures were compiled by the author from agency
responses to Administrative Conference survey dated August 22, 1983.
Responses are on fie at the Administrative Conference. Where 1983 figures
were not available, 1982 figures were
used as noted. "New cases" denote only
those cases that reached the stage of
referral to the agency's office of ALJs
for potential hearing. A large percentage
of these cases are resolved prior to actual
hearing.
Footnotes
a. Agencies are only those employing
at least one full-time ALI during the
period. Other agencies that have
occasional APA hearings may bor84

New cases filed
with ALJs-1978

ALJs-6/84

5
1

247
96

5
1

17

93
19
336
4
31
104
127
137
(f)
88
2,147
17
3
131
1,513
1,371
2,769
2719)

4
I
4
0"'

3
4
1
1
6
14
23
4
7
12
12
1
1
8
61
49
1
98
6
I
47
8

5,378
568
10
4,331

0
660
16
2
2

(a)
196,428
681
24
133
216,843

LM!!V

30(h)

6
12
21
II
6
12
8
9
1
9
10
84
3
107
5
3
22
6
1
760
11
2
4
1,121

New cases filed with
ALJs-1982* or 1983
250
107"
43
107*
858*
(a)
47
340
246
109
746
163
1,284
7
I*
37
500*
77
14,457
182
4,961
524
14
1,325
92
7
363,533
605
9*
477
391,108

row ALJs from other agencies, subject to approval by the Office of Personnel Management, 5 U.S.C. § 3344.
In 1983 such agencies reporting APA
hearings include the CPSC, Department of Education, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and Federal
Reserve Board. Total cases amount
to about 75. No such figures are available for 1978.

e. Corrected total; total in 1978 compilation was erroneously given as
1070.

b. 1978 figures are for Maritime Administration (later transferred to Department of Transportation). 1984 figures
are primarily for National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration.

f. The FLRA was created in 1979. In
1978, equivalent cases under Executive Order 11491 were handled by
the Department of Labor. There were
251 new cases in that program in 1978.

c. Does not include figures for Indian
probate cases (2083 new cases in 1978;
2961 in 1982) which are not subject
to the APA and are heard by 10 special hearing officers, but which are
otherwise similar to ALJ cases.

g. The MSPB was created in 1979. Figures for 1978 are from the Civil Service Commission.

d. The NRC's adjudicatory hearings are
presided over by three-member
Atomic Safety Licensing Boards

(drawn from a larger "panel"). One
of the three members is normally a
lawyer but need not be an AL. ALJs
serve on these boards and also preside individually over antitrust and
civil penalty cases. Caseload figures
reflect all cases filed with the boards
and ALJs.

h. This year was aberrational for the
SEC. Newcases forevery otheryear
between 1975 and 1983 were between
64 and 106.
i. The CPSC's ALJ position has
remained vacant since 1979.
Federal Bar News & Journal

17.9% (N =35) in 1947 to 19.6% (N =210)
3
in 1979 to 21.1% (N =236) in 1984.
Even more dramatic than the shift in
"ALJ-power" is the correlative caseload
trend.4 As the accompanying table indicates, the most dramatic development has
been the burgeoning Social Security caseload (primarily disability cases) which has
jumped 85% to 363,533 new case filings
from 1978 to 1983. During this period, the
Labor Department has shown the largest
percentage jump as new filings increased
more than fivefold to 14,457-with much
of the increase represented by black lung
benefits cases and longshoremen's and harbor workers' compensation cases. Except
for these huge SSA and Labor Department
benefit programs, only the steadily flowing
NLRB unfair labor practice cases, and the
dwindling mine safety and occupational
safety and health enforcement cases
amounted to more than one thousand new
filings in 1983. Severe drop-offs from 1978
levels were experienced by the ICC, CAB,
FTC, and Interior, while other agency programs (most notably the CFTC's reparations program, Commerce's fishery civil
penalty cases, the Postal Service's false
representation cases and the FLRA's Federal unfair labor practice cases) have shown
large percentage increases. Still it is inescapable that the administrative law judge
in today's Federal Government has become
less an organizer and initial decider of regulatory policy issues and more the (oftenfinal) dispenser of disability benefits or
arbiter of civil money penalties-cases
where factfinding, demeanor evidence,
fairness and speed are hallmarks, and pol5
icy issues absent or submerged."
The Aid Corps Bill
This shift in the role of agency adjudication away from deciding regulatory policy issues, with increased emphasis on
"mass justice" cases has helped revive
proposals to separate agency adjudicators
from the rest of the agency. Already Congress has followed this reasoning in several
specific enforcement programs involving a
high volume of fact-based cases: the
Department of Labor must enforce its mine
safety and occupational health and safety
programs by bringing violators before two
special independent adjudicatory agencies
that hear and decide challenges to the cita6
tions. A third adjudicatory agency, the
National Transportation Safety Board hears
and decides pilot license denial, revocation
7
and suspension cases brought by the FAA.
And finally, the Merit Systems Protection
Board, with its system of 3 ALJs and
approximately 100 hearing officers hearing
various employee appeals, with review by
November 1984/Volume 31 No. 9

an independent board, is the most recent
example. 1
Proponents of separation would now
extend this principle to the entire corps of
administrative lawjudges. A proposal, supported by the Federal ALI professional
organization," to establish a nationwide
Corps ofFederal Administrative Law Judges
has been introduced by Senator Howard
Heflin as S. 1275,20 and two hearings have
2
been held on the bill in the 98th Congress.
The Heflin bill would remove the ALJs
from the supervision and control of the
agencies where they are currently employed
and transform them into an independent
unified corps. The concept of a unified corps
22
(which is in place in 8 states) has produced
some weighty, but still largely theoretical,
23
arguments for and against, and the Heflin
bill in particular has already been the subject of much spirited criticism and
approval.' The bill would not disturb the
agencies' ability to review ALJ initial decisions, instead a trial bench would be created outside the agencies, divided into divi2
sions; 1 managed by a chiefjudge and division chief judges who are selected by a
high-level nominating commission, with all
judges subject to an elaborate removal and
26
discipline procedure. Most of these details
27
have been aired sufficiently elsewhere,
but the makeup of the divisions in light of
current caseloads is worthy of examination.

"A proposal, supported by the
FederalAU professional
organization, 9 to establish a
nationwide Corps of Federal
Administrative Law Judges has
been introduced...
The bill specifies that from four to ten
divisions be created, with the exact number
and make up subject to adjustment at any
time by the "council" of the corps, comprised of the chief judge and the division
chief judges. Initially, however, the bill
establishes seven named divisions 2reflecting various areas of specialization.
It is possible, using these divisions, and
projecting current agency judge positions
and caseload, to gain some idea of the size
and workloads of these divisions. According to a list of current agencies fitting within
these divisions, prepared by two support26
ers of the bill, the following sizes and
caseloads can be derived:
(1)Division of Communications, Public
Utility and Transportation Regulation: 56 ALJs, 652 cases;
(2) Division of Health, Safety and Envi-

ronmental Regulation: 66 ALJs, 4685
cases;
(3) Division of Labor (sic): 84 AUs,
14,457 cases;
(4) Division of Labor Relations: 118
ALJs, 5707 cases;
(5) Division of Benefits Programs: 760
ALJs, 363,533 cases;
(6) Division of Securities, Commodities
and Trade Regulation: 25 ALJs, 1163
cases;
(7) Division of General Programs and
Grants: 12 ALJs, 858 cases.
This projection indicates one of the primary weaknesses of the proposed omnibus
ALI corps: two of the divisions, each swallowing whole the existing ALI contingent
and caseload of an individual agency (SSA
and DOL), dwarf the rest of the corps.
Furthermore, a third division is simply an
amalgam of the NLRB and FLRA casesperhaps a sensible combination, but one
that Congress eschewed when it created
the FLRA in 1978. The remaining four divisions do represent real consolidation and
potential savings and efficiencies, though
specialists in the various fields of law represented might have some difficulty in
accepting them.
The comprehensiveness of a corps
encompassing all current administrative law
judges is appealing, but I believe that the
lack of balance in the proposed divisions
and the real differences among the covered
agencies suggests the need for caution and
further analysis. As an initial point, I would
urge that it is foolish to try to assimilate
the Social Security Administration's ALJs
into the unified corps-even an anaconda
can't digest an elephant. Rather, any problems of real or perceived lack of decisional
0
independence on the part of the 760 SSA
ALJs who operate in 10 regional and 131
field offices throughout the United States"'
(including some bilingual judges in Puerto
Rico) deserve separate consideration. If the
problems are sufficiently documented, then
perhaps there is a need for an administrative "Social Security Review Commission" with trial judges and reviewing officials totally separated from the rest of the
Department of HHS.' Such a court could
also be made into a more generalized disability and retirement benefits court, thereby
encompassing the similar black lung and
longshoremen's and habor workers' cases
in the Department of Labor, (still leaving
DOL with a relatively large residuum of
cases) and conceivably the non-APA cases
heard by the Board of Veterans Appeals
and the Railroad Retirement Board.
The Department of Labor's cases also
deserve special attention." As mentioned
above, Congress has already seen fit to
separate entirely two major adjudicative

programs from DOL policymakers and
enforcers. And in the two largest programs
that are currently handled by DOL ALJs
(making up 85% of the office's 1983 APA
caseload) Congress has directed that agency
review be conducted by a separate reviewing agency, the "Benefits Review Board"'
with a large, but not complete," degree of
internal independence. Congress could
easily move to make that independence
complete if it wished to.
As for the proposed Division of Labor
Relations, the two component agencies, the
NLRB and FLRA, are both structured so
that an independent general counsel has
complete discretion to bring cases before
the ALJs, creating an effective separation
between the prosecuting and judging functions.w It might be argued that the possibility of undue decisional pressure from
agency Members on ALJs is still present,
but the strong opposition to the Heflin bill
by NLRB Aids would seem to rebut any
37
such suggestion.
Thus, using the Hefiin bill's proposed
divisions as a benchmark, three of the divisions (Labor, Labor Relations, and Benefits Programs) lose much of their appeal
when examined closely. The otherfour make
more sense, though I believe it is unnecessary at this time to include the four previously discussed adjudicatory agencies
(OSHRC, FMSHRC, NTSB and MSPB).
It is also arguably premature to include the
economic regulatory agencies, most of
which still have a medium volume of relatively specialized cases, and most of which
are still adjusting to the effects of the deregulation movement which is tending to reduce
their caseloads while shifting their emphasis toward enforcement and away from initial licensing. These agencies would include
the CAB, EPA, FCC, FERC, FMC, FTC,
NRC and SEC. In effect, then, I would
whittle down the corps to an experimental
program, with one division-an expanded
"general programs division"-with Aids
from the following agencies:

This proposal is a slightly scaled down
version of an experimental corps to be
administered by the Office of Personnel
Management, that I proposed in 198138 and
that the Chairman of the Administrative
Conference, Loren Smith, suggested to
Senator Hefrin in 1983.Y As Chairman Smith
said, "Ifthese... ALJs (plus achiefjudge,
augmented by a few more judges who would
also cover agencies that occasionally need
an ALJ, but do not employ one full-time)
were transferred into a corps under OPM
control to service all but the specifically
excluded agencies, the idea would be put
to a good test.
The proposal did not, however, go
unchallenged. Joseph Morris, General
Counsel of OPM, testifying in opposition
to the Heflin bill, also criticized the experiment as espoused by Mr. Smith:
My friend, Loren Smith, has suggested
an experiment that would exclude from a
corps the large bulk of the members of the
present administrative law judiciary, those
presiding over cases in SSA, the Department of Labor, and the National Labor
Relations Board.
Interestingly, it is those administrative
law judges whose work falls most clearly
and most cleanly in the area of adjudicative
and quasi-adjudicative work in the executive branch as opposed to ratemaking, rulemaking, and other quasi-legislative activities in the executive branch.
Put otherwise, it is in the smaller agencies, in the minority of members of the
existing administrative law judiciary, that
we find the most critical and the most apparent need for subject matter expertise.
It is in the larger agencies employing
administrative law judges that there appears
on the face of it, under the principles motivating the Administrative Procedure Act,
a greater fungibility ofjudges-fungibility
in the sense that less subject matter exper-

tise is required because the areas are less
technical or they are more akin to issues
that arise in common law proceedings.
So, it is our view that the proposal for
an experimental corps that would exclude
the large agencies employing AU's contains an irony that ultimately defeats the
wisdom of the proposal, and that irony is
precisely that such an experiment would
focus on the fungibility of those AU's who
are least fungible and would exclude from
the scope of the experiment those AL's
who, among ALU's, are most fungible; that
is, who have the most adjudicative, least
regulatory or rulemaking work to do.
Therefore, we think that the proposed
experiment is ill-advised."
I believe that Mr. Morris' focus on "fungibility" misses the point of the experiment
somewhat. It is certainly an over-generalization to claim that Aids employed by
larger agencies (or, more precisely,
employed by agencies with the largest
number of Aids) are more fungible than
those employed by smaller agencies. Indeed
the proposal reflects an attempt to assess
carefully the suitability of including various
AILJs into an experimental corps based upon
existing agency structures, the transferability of expertise, and upon the need for
a manageable experiment. Furthermore,
because economy of scale is one of the
strongest reasons in favor of a unified corps,
it makes more sense, on that basis at least,
to combine many smaller AU contingents
than to combine a few larger ones.
Tip of the Iceberg?
The proposal for a unified corps ofAids,
which I suggest may be too inclusive (especially with respect to Social Security cases),
does have a key limitation: it does not include
presiding officers who are not Aids. This

-,

-M70
J.

....

Coast Guard
I
Interior
9
Agriculture
5
CFTC
4
Postal Service
4
ITC
2
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
I
Commerce
I
Drug Enforcement Admin.
I
FDA
I
HUD
I
SBA
1
42 ALJs
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0
0
is a practical, even sensible, limitation since
ALJs are appointed under a common system, possess a common degree of independence and act in cases that Congress has
deemed to be formal proceedings subject
42
to the APA. Nevertheless, if only to place
the ALI corps proposal in context and to
consider its possible growth, it is advisable
to consider the many other programs
involving relatively formal adjudications that
are presided over by hearing officers who
are not administrative law judges.
Some of these programs are explicitly
excepted from all of the APA's adjudication requirements, e.g., cases involving the
selection or tenure of federal employees
(except ALJs), certification of worker representatives, or conduct of military or for3
eign affairs functions. Except for these,
all other adjudicative programs are covered
by the APA, and where the adjudication is
"required to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing, "I
any hearing must be presided over by either
the agency head (a rare event) or one or
more ALJs-uness, another statute specifies that a particular category of proceedings is to be presided over by designated
"
boards or employees. Of course, if an "onthe-record" hearing is not required in a
program, the agency is free, within the
bounds of due process, to utilize any
employee as a presider.
It should not be surprising then that there
are some significant statutorily designated
boards and employees hearing formal, "on
the record" cases, and many presiding officers hearing less formal cases throughout
the Government."
Marvin Morse has recently identified in
November 1984/Volume 31 No. 9

these pages 342 "attorney examiners," as
classified by OPM, now hearing cases in
47
the Government. These include 119 MSPB
48
hearing officers, 78 "administrative
judges" who serve on Boards of Contract
9
Appeals in ten agencies, 51 Department
of Justice immigration judges, 40 members
of the Board of Veterans Appeals, 26 members of various tribunals in the Department
of the Interior, 15 Social Security Administration Appeals Council members, and 7
Department of Commerce Trademark Trial
and Appeals Board members, and 6 Small
Business Administration hearing officers.
In addition to this list there are scores of
other hearing officers who serve in various
roles and capacities throughout the gov°
ernment." Some of the more significant
clusters include the 21 full time and 27 part
5
time officers who, along with 3 ALJs,
comprise the NRC's Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board Panel; the 37 full time lawyers with scientific background who serve
on the Boards of Patent Appeals (30) and
Patent Interferences (7) in the Department
of Commerce; 86 "attorney examiners" at
the EEOC who conduct hearings and make
recommended decisions involving equal
employment complaints against federal
agencies; 9 "appeal referees" at the Railroad Retirement Board; 5presiding officers
in Department of Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals; 4 members of the Depart52
ment of HHS Grant Appeals Board; 4 full
time hearing examiners at the Department
of Defense who hear industrial security
clearance review cases; 3 members of the
Department of State's Foreign Service
Grievance Board; and many other individuals too numerous to identify.

Agencies also report many programs
involving the use of employees with other
functions who serve as part-time presiding
officers or board members. For example,
the Federal Service Impasses Panel, an
entity within the FLRA, reports a pool of
120 potential hearing officers available from
its staff to conduct factfinding hearings in
labor impasses. And the Department of
Defense utilizes over one hundred parttime members of boards for the correction
of military records. Finally, two agencies
reported hiring presiding officers on a contractual basis (Department of Education
Appeal Board, 27 of 30 members; DOD's
CHAMPUS program, 9 hearing officers).
As stated above, the proposed ALJ corps
bill ignores all of these non-ALJ hearing
officers. The only provision relating to nonAPA cases is permissive-it permits agencies (and courts) to refer any case to the
corps where such a reference is found to
53
be desirable and appropriate. But Professor Harold Levinson has raised the question of whether these non-ALJ hearing officers, who lack even the current independence enjoyed by ALJS, should also be
brought into the corps.' The result, of
course, would be a much bigger corps, but
with the benefit that there would no longer
be distinctions between those judges who
currently function under the APA and those
who are governed by special statutes. This,
with the addition of such other Article I
courts such as the Tax Court and the Claims
5
Court, is the administrative trial court writ
large. It is certainly useful to think in these
logical, thicket-clearing terms, but before
such a braod swath is actually cut, a much
better survey of this dense underbrush is
needed.
Conclusion
There is much ferment in the field of
administrative adjudication at present. Not
only are there movements to modify the
way adjudications are performed (witness
the trend toward "alternative dispute res56
olution"), but renewed debates about how
best to structure administrative adjudication are also being heard. There is new
recognition that the overall scheme by which
the government decides cases-some in
Article III district courts, some in quasiArticle III forums like bankruptcy courts
and magistrates, some in Article I courts
like the Tax Court and Claims Court, some
in traditional agencies operating under the
APA and using ALJs, some in special adjudicatory agencies, and some in agency
hearings presided over by non-ALls-needs
a comprehensive review. It is a healthy
development that this variegated system is
getting renewed attention, spurred by the

debate over the proposed Federal unified
corps of administrative law judges. It would
be beneficial to fashion a manageable
experiment to try out the corps concept on
the Federal level, but this focus on the
corps bill should not obscure the reality
that the role of the ALJ has changed dramatically in recent years and that there is
a much larger world of non-APA, non-ALJ
adjudication in the agencies that deserves
just as much understanding and study.

relied on the views of subordinates and that the
hearing officer had prepared no tentative report
to which the plaintiff might file exceptions. The
Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case.
'See Musolf. supra note I at 41-42.
'Message from the President of the United
States Returning without Approval the BillIH.R.
6324) Entitled, "An Act to Provide for the more
Expeditious Settlement ofDisputes, and for other
Purposes, H. Doc. 986, 76th Cong.. 3d Sess.,
pp. 2-3.
'Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, p. 6 (1941).
Printed as S. Doc. No. 8, 88th Cong., Ist. Sess.
(1941).
'Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch.
324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§
551-559, 701-706, 1305,3105, 3344, 5372, 7521
(1982). In 1978, the APA was amended to substitute the title "administrative law judge" for
the earlier designation, "hearing examiner." Act
of March 27, 1978,Pub. L. 95-251.
'See Musolf, supra note I at 46 ("Here the
Act accomplished the most decisive changes

istrative Law Judges Conference) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S.1275).
'See 129Cong. Rec. S. 6609-l0(daily ed. May
12, 1983)(statement of Sen. Heflinl. See also,
Heflin, Query: ShouldAdministrative Law Judges
belndependentofTheirAgencies?67 Judicature
369 (1984). A companion bill,
H.R. 3539, was
introduced by Rep. Shelby in the House of Representatives, on June 12.1983and a similar bill,
H.R. 5156, was introduced on March 15, 1984
by Rep. Glickman.
"Hearings on S. 1275. supra note 19. The
hearings were held on June 23 and September
20, 1983.
"See Rich, The Central Panel System and the
Decisionmaking Independence of Administrative Lau, Judges: Lessons for a Proposed Federal Program, 6 W. N. Eng. L.Rev. 643 (1984);
FOOTNOTES
M. Rich & W. Brucar, The Central Panel System
forAdministrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven
'See Musolf, Federal Examiners and the ConStates (1983). The eight states are California.
flict ofLaw and Administration (1953)for arichly
Colorado, Florida. Massachusetts, Minnesota,
rewarding account of these debates and their
New Jersey, Tennessee. and Washington.
aftermath. The following portion of the text draws
2See Lubbers. supra note 15.at 273-275 for
heavily from pages 38-43. For a more recent
a listing of pros and cons.
dissertation on these issues, see Freedman, Cri-4For strong statements of support see Palmer
"°See Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco
sis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Harv. and Bernstein, Establishing Federal Adminisand American Government (1978).
trative
Law Judges as an Independent Corps:
2Annual Report of the American Bar Associ- L. Rev. 759 (1950); Thomas, The Selection of
Federal Hearing Examiners; Pressure Groups The Heflin Bill, 6 W. N. Eng.L. Rev. 673(1984);
ation, LXI (1936), 731.
'President's Committee on Administrative and the Administrative Process, 59 Yale L.J. Levant,A Unified Corps ofAdministrative Lam,
Management, Report with Special Studies 40 431(1950). For a later account by the then-Chair- Judges-The Transition from a Concept to a
man of the Civil Service Commission, see Macy, Reality, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 705 (1984). Fora
(1937).
4UnitedStates v. Morgan, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products rebuttal see Zankel. A Unified Corps of Federal
This was the first in a series of Supreme Court of a Viable Political Society, 27 Fed. Bar. J. 351 Administrative Law Judges is Not Needed, 6 W.
N. Eng. L. Rev. 723 (1984). All of the above
cases growing out of a Department of Agricul- (1967).
areFederal
ALJs. See also Hearings on
ture ratemaking. Challengers to the rates objected
"See, e.g., Symposium: Administrative Law authors
that the Secretary had not personally heard or Judges, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 587 (1984); Sym- S. 1275, supra, note 19 for testimony pro and
considered the evidence and arguments but had posium: The Central Panel System: A New con.
"The bill does call for a two year study of the
Framework for the Use of Administrative Law
various types and levels of agency review. S.
Judges, 65 Judicature 233 (November, 1981).
1275,§ 3. For a recent examination of structures
"Figures below are all derived from periodic
LAW SCHOOL TEACHING
of agency review of AL decisions, see Cass,
reports of the Office of Personnel Management's
APPLICANTS SOUGHT
Office of ALls. The January, 1979 figure was Agency Review of Administrative Lau, Judges'
Decisions, Report to the Administrative Conrecomputed.
See
Morse,
The
Administrative
Law
The University of Iowa College of
Judge-A New Direction for the Corps? 30 ference of the U.S. (December 1983).
Law seeks applicants for permanent
Fed. Bar N & 1 398, 399 (1983); Lubbers, A
"The subject of removal and discipline of ALs
or visiting classroom and clinical
Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the has also been a hot topic lately. See Rosenblum,
Idea at the Federal Level, 65 Judicature 266, 268 Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause"
teaching positions. We are inter(1981). The October, 1982 figure is in Hearings as Criterion for Removal ofAdministrative Law
ested in all persons of high academic
on S. 1275, infra note 19 at 63. The June 1984 Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. N. Eng.
promise, Irrespective of prior teachfigure has been obtained from OPM by the author. L. Rev. 593 (1984);
Timony, Disciplinary Proing experience, and wish to assure
"This includes judges from the FLRA,
ceedings Against Federal Administrative Law
the diversity of our faculty by includFMSHRC, Labor Department, NLRB and Judges, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 807 (1984).
OSHRC.
ing among our candidates persons
"Specific criticism of aspects of the bill are
"See Federal Administrative Law Judges
contained
in Levinson, The Proposed Adminof all races, sexes, religions, national
Hearings-Statistical
Report
for
1976-1978,
istrative
Law Judge Corps: An Incomplete But
origins, ages, and other groups that
Administrative Conference of the U.S. (1980),
Important Reform Effort (forthcoming) 19 N.
traditionally have been underreprefor an agency-by-agency analysis of caseloads.
Eng. L. Rev. .. ___(1984). (Draft on file at the
seated in the legal profession. ConData for 1982-1983 were compiled by the author
Administrative Conference of the U.S.)
from agency responses to an Administrative
sideration of any applicant for a facIS. 1275§ 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
Conference questionnaire dated August 22, 1983. § 564). The Glickman bill, H.R. 5156, supra note
ulty position may depend upon the
Responses are on file at the Administrative Con20,provides for six initial divisions, combining
current curricular needs of the Colference.
the judges at the Department of Labor, NLRB
lege, though considerable flexibility
"See Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A
and FLRA into a single division.
ordinarily exists with respect to
Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal Level,
"Palmer & Bernstein, supra note 24 at 680 n.
65 Judicature 266, 268-272 (1981) for an elabocourses and other assignments. Per39. 1 have assumed that "Maritime Commisration
on
this
trend.
sons interested in a career in law
sion" as listed intheir list of agencies subsumed
6Occupational Safety and Health Review
under the Division of General Programs is a
teaching should send resumes, refCommission, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982); Federal
misnomer since the Federal Maritime Commiserences and descriptions of areas of
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,
sion is already listed under Division 1. 1 have
interest to: Faculty Recruitment
30 U.S.C. § 823 (1982).
substituted the Small Business Administration
Committee, College of Law, Univer"149U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1429 (1982).
which is not listed on their chart. To summarize
"5 U.S.C. § 1201(1982).
the list: Division (1): FCC, FERC, ICC, CAB,
sity of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.
FMC, NRC; Division (2): OSHRC, FMSHRC,
"See Administrative Law Judge Corps Act:
The University of Iowa College of
Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on
NTSB, EPA, Interior, Commerce, Coast Guard;
Law is an equal opportunity and
Division (3): Labor; Division (4): NLRB,FLRA;
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
affirmative action employer.
Division (5): SSA; Division (6): Agriculture,
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist
CFTC, SEC, FTC, USITC; Division (7): DEA,
Sess. 25 (1983)(statement of the Federal Admin-
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HUD, FDA, ATF, SBA, USPS, MSPB.
•"The independence of Social Security ALJs
in the face of pressures to increase production
and to decrease agency allowance rates has been
a subject of controversy for years. See Social
Security Administrative Law Judges: Survey and
Issue Paper, Subcomm. on Social Security of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. print 1979); The Role
of the Administrative Law Judge in the Title 11
Social Security Disability Program, Report by
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (Committee
Print 1983).
2See Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 19 at
158 (testimony of Joseph B. Kennedy, suggesting such an independent adjudicatory agency).
Two bills have been introduced in the 98th Congress to create a five member Health and Human
Services Review Commission, S. 1911 (Sen.
Pryor) "A bill to ensure the independence of
certain administrative law judges"; and H.R.
3541 (Rep. Wise) (part of a more extensive revision of the Social Security Act). This proposal
differs from the "Social Security Court" bill,
introduced by Rep. Pickle, H.R. 5700 § 12, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., which would replace the Federal district courts as a forum for judicial review
of decisions of the SSA.
3See comments by the Chief Administrative
Law Judge of the Department of Labor, in Litt,

Foreword: This Year's Reform is Next Year's
NeedforReform; 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 587,589
(1984).
3433 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1982).
"See Kalarisv. Donovan, 697 F 2d. 376 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3088 (1983)
(members of Benefits Review Board may be
removed at the discretion of the Secretary of
Labor).
"6The NLRB general counsel serves a term of
four years and, in practice at least, has been
insulated from removal for the length of the term,
7 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982). The FLRA general
counsel serves a term of five years, but is removable by the President, 5 U.S.C. § 7104(0(1) (1982).
"7See Zankel, supra note 24, at 723 n. 3., and
Hearingson S. 1275, supra note 19, at 175-190
(statement ofJoseph B. Kennedy containing poll
of agency ALJs re S. 1275-10 NLRB ALJs
voted
yes and 20 no).
5
' Lubbers, supra note 15. In this proposal I
have also excluded the EPA (as a regulatory
agency), the FLRA (due to its internal separation), and the NTSB and MSPB (as already independent adjudicatory bodies).
"See Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 19 at
113 (statement of Loren A. Smith).
'Id. at 119.
4'Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 19 at 138
(statement of Joseph A. Morris).
42For a description of the ALJ program's operations see Lubbers, FederalAdministrativeLaw
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Judges: A Focus on our Invisible Judiciary, 33
Ad. L. Rev. 109 (1981). The OPM has recently
revised its examination and selection procedures, see Office of Personnel Management,
Administrative Law Judge (Examination
Announcement No. 318) (May, 1984).
*5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
"Ild.
-5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1982).
'At some point, of course, these less formal
proceedings shade into that rather uncharted mass
of agency action known as informal action. See
Gardner, The Informal Actions of the Federal
Government, 26 Am. U.L. Rev. 799 (1977). For
the purpose of this article, and the questionnaire
to agencies, supra note 14, an adjudication program attains a sufficient degree of formality to
be included if it offers an opportunityfor an oral
fact-finding hearing before a presiding official
acting in a quasi-judicialcapacity. Thus, decisions on FOIA requests, camping permits or air
traffic control, while technically adjudications,
would be distinguishable from that discussed in
this article. Creating clear and workable distinctions between these various levels of non-APA
adjudications is a project for another day. For
one useful attempt, see Verkuil. A Study of
Informal Adjudication Procedures,43 U. Chi.
L. Rev, 739 (1976).
'Morse, supra note 12, at 400.
'As of August 1984, there were 96 MSPB
hearing officers. Telephone interview with
MSPB's Office of Administrative Law Judges,
August 1984.
47These judges are appointed pursuant to the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978,41 U.S.C. §§601613 (1982). The Act provides that the judges are
to be appointed in the same manner as administrative law judges, provided that they have at
least five years' experience in public contract
law. Id. § 607(b). The boards review appeals
from decisions of agency contracting officers,
but, unlike ALfs, the boards' decisions are final
agency action. Id. § 607(g). The largest board is
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
which has thirty three members and disposes of
approximately 1,000 appeals annually (DOD
questionnaire response, supra note 14).
"Why these officers are not classified as
"attorney examiners" by OPM is not known.
This information is drawn from responses to
Administrative Conference questionnaire, suprn
note 14. Professor Larry Bakken of Hamline
University School of Law is currently studying
these programs for the Administrative Conference.
'Eleven of the full time officers and six of the
part time officers are attorneys. Telephone interview with NRC Chief Judge Cotter's Office, July
1984.
"2For a comprehensive description of the various grant dispute resolution procedures, see
Steinberg, Federal Grant Dispute Resolution,
Report to the Administrative Conference of the
United States, printed in Mezines, Stein and
Graff, Administrative Law (chapters 53 and 54)
(1983).
" . 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5, U.S.C. § 568(d)).
.
"Levinson, supra note 27 at __
"See 28 U.S.C. §§ 271 et seq. (Claims Court):
26 U.S.C. § 7441 (Tax Court).
'The Administrative Conference is currently
studying the use of alternative dispute resolution
techniques (e.g., arbitration, mediation, conciliation, mini-trials, etc.) by Federal agencies.

